In the last decade, many European countries have seen a sharp increase in the number of automated fueling stations. We study the effect of this process innovation on prices at stations that are automated and their competitors using a difference-in-differences matching strategy. Our estimates show that prices at automated stations drop by 1.0 to 2.1% immediately after conversion and stabilize at this lower level. We find no indication of competitive spillover effects to neighboring sites at the conventional significance levels. Other than previous studies, our estimates do not reveal a difference in impact between early and later adopters of automation.
Introduction
In the last decade, unmanned or automated fueling stations have proliferated across Europe.
Automated fueling sites are completely unstaffed and payment is by debit or credit card at the pump only. According to one large study, 7.7% of all service stations in the European Union were unstaffed in 2012, but with large cross-country differences. 1 In Scandinavian countries such as Denmark and Sweden the share of unmanned stations was found to be over 60% in 2012 while in other countries such as Italy and Hungary it was less than 1%.
Declining fuel volumes and a desire to cut fixed staffing cost seems to drive the increased activity of converting service stations into unstaffed sites. 2 At converted sites, this may lead to lower price levels if realized cost reductions are partially or fully passed onto consumers. There may also be competitive spillovers in the form of lower prices at nearby competitors. The aim of this study is to empirically estimate the extent to which these direct and competitive effects on prices are statistically and substantially significant.
The literature on technology evolution distinguishes between product and process innovations. Whereas in the early stage of a product technology's life cycle product innovation is the most important mode of innovation, in the later stages when the product design stabilizes, process innovations that enable firms to produce the same output using less input take over as the dominant innovation mode (Adner and Levinthal, 2001) . The transition to automated fuel retailing is a good example of a process innovation in an industry in the later stages of its technology cycle. In the Netherlands, full service stations where an attendant at the forecourt delivers fuel into the customers car disappeared in the 1970s and 1980s. Nowadays, all staffed stations are self service stations where customers pump their own gas. 3 Given the rise of non-cash debit and credit card payments in everyday transactions, the adoption of automats that allow for payment at the pump instead of at a cashier only is a natural next step. Automation lowers a firm's cost while leaving the physical product that consumers receive unaltered. Moreover, whereas the impact of process innovations on prices 1 Civic Consulting (2014 , Table 89 ). Four regions in Spain have recently stalled the rise of unstaffed stations by adopting legislation that requires all service stations to have at least one employee present during opening hours. This happened on instigation of an alliance of employers, unions and consumers that cited potential safety risks, job losses and barriers to people with disabilities. http://economia.elpais.com/economia/2015/02/06/ actualidad/1423251729_289297.html.
2 See CBRE (2012) . 3 The same development has happened in many other countries. Basker et al. (2017) study the adoption of self service pumps in the U.S between 1977-1992 and show how this shifting of work to customers biases upward conventional measures of labor productivity.
is mostly hard to measure because either the innovations themselves are invisible and/or price data are not easily available, retail gasoline markets are instead very favorable to studying this question empirically. First, automation is a visible event which allows us to pin down the date of automation rather precisely. Second, fuel prices are readily available at the station-level and cleanly measured. This allows us to use stations as the unit of observation in our analysis.
Third, because oil companies already frequently adjust their retail prices to reflect fluctuations in the price of inputs (notably the oil spot price), changing prices due to automation does not involve any additional menu cost. The absence of menu cost increases the likelihood that price effects, if any, become apparent shortly after the event of automation. Despite these advantages, we are the first to address the impact of automated fuel retailing on prices.
Our paper is related to other papers on technology adoption in retail markets, such as Foster, Haltiwanger and Krizan (2006) , Basker (2012 Basker ( , 2015 and Carranza, Clark and Houde (2015) . Foster et al. (2006) compare the productivity gains across multiple retail sectors. They find that most of gains in labor productivity are due to the entry of more productive firms that replace less productive ones. As in the current study, Carranza et al. (2015) turn to gasoline markets and study the effect of price floor regulations on technology adoption. They find that such regulations reduce efficiency by barring the entry of low-cost retailers but do not increase prices. Basker (2012) studies the effects of introducing barcode scanners on labor productivity and prices. Basker (2012) finds that the introduction of scanning reduces the wage bill with 4.5%.
Most related to our work is Basker (2015) , in which she considers the impact of scanners on the prices of various grocery products. She estimates that these prices have decreased by at least 1.4% because of the introduction of scanners. As with the introduction of scanners, the event of fuel station automation speeds up the checkout process and there is no impact on the physical product received by consumers, which Basker (2015) calls a "pure" process innovation. 4 Also, similar to the introduction of scanning in the U.S. retail sector, the diffusion of automation in the Netherlands happened gradually. This phase-in feature makes it possible to identify the price effect of automation by comparing the price levels before and after automation of treated sites with those of a suitably selected set of control stations that did not experience automation. The detection of treatment effects is possible as long as the price effects of automation materialize quickly enough relative to time for the phase-in to complete (Duflo, Glennerster and Kremer, 2007) . The empirical estimates show that this condition holds in our case.
We employ an extensive data set that contains price quotes of over 80% of all outlets in the Netherlands for the time period 10/2005-04/2011. The Dutch market is an interesting market to consider because with a market share for unmanned stations of 25.1% in March 2011, it can be classified as a market in transition: The share of unmanned stations is sufficiently large for its economic impact to be estimable. At the same time, the share is sufficiently small not to be considered a mature unmanned fuel retailing market that has already reached a new steady state equilibrium. As a consequence, our study focuses on the short-run effects of automation, i.e. the price effects in the stage of development where adoption of automated fuel retailing at about 25% at the end of the sample period. Table 1 shows that the share of unmanned stations has steadily increased in the period considered with no signs of this trend leveling off near the end. With the proportion of unmanned sites at 12.4% in November 2005, the Dutch market has witnessed a doubling of the proportion of unmanned stations in the period we consider.
Our estimation sample of 2,973 individual off-highway stations with on average more than 1,000 price quotes per station allows us to include day fixed effects in all our regressions. These pick up time-variant shocks common to all sites, such as price fluctuations due to developments in the international oil market. Next to that, station-level fixed effects are included such that identification of our key parameters is based on within-site variation. This is a notable difference with Basker (2015) who is constrained in her analysis by the fact that the scanner installation mostly happened in the 1970s and 1980s, a period for which only quarterly city-level average price data are available. As a result, she cannot make pre-and post-installation price comparisons at the store level nor study the competitive spillovers to nearby stores. The high-frequency nature of our price data allows us to match the automation events to pre-and post-automation price data at the site level and to investigate the presence of competitive spillovers.
We use a difference-in-difference matching strategy that creates balance between the treatment group of stations that are automated and a control group of stations that do not experience automation. We match treated and control units using the propensity score. The fact that new price quotes arrive almost daily enables a precise identification of post-event price movements in the weeks following automation. This informs us whether unit cost reductions are passed through to consumers immediately or with a lag.
Our main empirical findings are the following. First, our difference-in-difference matching estimates show that automation reduces the prices with on average 1.2-2.6 eurocents per liter (cpl) before taxes. This corresponds to a decrease of 1.0 to 2.1% in the price paid by consumers. 5 Second, the price adjustment happens instantly in the week of automation and the prices stay at these lower levels in the months following. Third, although the coefficient plots of lagged price responses suggest some competitive spillovers to neighboring service stations within 1 km and especially 2 km radius, these effects are very small and not significant. Finally, in contrast to Basker (2015) , who shows that early adopters of scanning infrastructure contribute disproportionately to the observed price decreases, we find that the impact of automation is similar for service stations that were automated in different points of time. A main reason for this difference in finding is provided by the different nature of the innovation. Whereas the introduction of scanning opens up possibilities for grocery stores to adopt complementary processes that help to optimize the use of inputs, such as tracking sales and changing worker schedules, automation of fuel stations offers much less scope for such complementary innovations.
The paper continues as follows. Section 2 provides a classification of retail fueling services to elucidate the differences between staffed and unstaffed stations. Section 3 introduces the data. Section 4 outlines our estimation strategy and Section 5 gives the main results. Section 6 concludes.
Retail Fueling Services
Three main forms of fueling services can be distinguished. At full service stations, an attendant is present at the forecourt who delivers fuel into the customer's car. Next to that, the attendant may offer other services such as cleaning the windows, checking oil, tyres etc. At self-service stations, there is no such attendant and customers pump their own fuel. Payment is to a cashier sitting in a shop or booth. For security reasons, it is forbidden for this employee to leave the shop which rules out the performance of services at the forecourt similar to those of attendants at full service stations. The defining characteristic of unmanned or automated stations is that payment in the shop or booth is not possible. Instead, automats are installed at each pump (or pair of pumps) that enable customers to pay by credit or debit card immediately without visiting the shop or booth.
This classification into self service stations and automated service stations does not strictly delineate stations with and without a shop or stations with and without the possibility to pay at the pump. Especially larger self service stations may have a limited number of one or two pumps equipped with an automat for credit and debit card payments that can be used either 24/7 or only outside the staffed opening hours. A shop may be present at automated stations.
In some cases, this shop is operated by the same company that operates the forecourt, in other cases, the shop and forecourt are operated by different companies. In all these cases, shop and fuel sales are however strictly separated in that customers cannot pay for fuel in the shop. At some automated stations without a shop, basic food and non-food items (such as soft drinks, candy bars and cigarettes) can nevertheless be bought at vending machines.
In the Netherlands, full service stations have long given way to stations that operate under either a self service or automated service concept. 6 Unstaffed retailing started in 2000 when the company Tango opened the first unstaffed station of the country. Tango -the brand name is a combination of the words "tank" and "go" -was explicitly founded on the premise that enabling customers to pay directly at the pump would reduce the time to complete a transaction because customers no longer have to queue for payment in the shop or booth. In turn, the high degree of automation lowers cost which the company promises "to return to the customer in the form of a discount." 7
The possibility and need to pay at the pump has been the defining characteristic that distinguishes all automated fuel stations that have established since then (Section 3.2 gives exact numbers on how many stations had been automated in the period we consider). The change in payment method at the day of automation may be accompanied with other changes such as a change in brand name or a change in shop activities. In the analysis, we account for any brand name changes. Unfortunately, we lack station-level information on changes that happen to the layout or operation of the shop at the time of automation. The most commonly observed change is that small shops up to 15m 2 where shop sales are secondary to handling fuel payments are closed after automation. In the empirical analysis, we will account for this by presenting 6 At the end of 2011, outside the period considered in this paper, Shell announced a local test to re-introduce the attendant at one of its stations.
(https://www.tankpro.nl/pompshop/2011/10/07/ pompbediende-gaat-weer-helpen-bij-tanken/). This results did have not lead to a wider introduction of this concept. In fact, station owners commonly talk of "full service stations" when referring to self-service stations with a shop that sells a wide assortment of items that may include evening meals, snacks, premium coffee, fresh vegetables, etc.
7 See https://www.tango.nl/overtango (visited April 29, 2017) for a short history of Tango and their business concept. In 2004, Tango has been taken over by Kuwait Petroleum. estimates that condition on the presence or absence of a shop in the pre-automation period.
Data

Data collection and sample selection
For our empirical analysis, we use fleet-card data provided by Athlon Car Lease (Athlon, hereafter), the leading car leasing company in the Netherlands with a fleet of over 125,000 cars. 8
Every day, Athlon captures station-specific retail gasoline prices using information retrieved from fleet-card users who frequent these stations. Athlon's methodology of using card data is very similar to the one used by OPIS, an agency that provides detailed information on gasoline retail prices for the US market. 9 The scope of the data in terms of coverage and frequency of price quotes is also very similar. In total, price quotes of 3,826 different sites are collected which implies a coverage of about 85 percent of all outlets in the country. This number is comparable to the coverage by OPIS of around 90 per cent (Chandra and Tappata, 2011). 10 Although price information is collected for all grades of gasoline, diesel, and liquefied petroleum gas (LPG), we limit attention in this paper to the sales of regular unleaded 95 octane gasoline (known as Euro 95) at off-highway sites. Euro 95 is the most commonly used type of fuel in the Netherlands. The reason for focusing on off-highway sites is twofold. In two competition cases, the European Commission has argued that highway and off-highway stations constitute separate product markets. 11 Consistent with this, our data exhibits pointedly higher prices at highway sites. 12 Also, while off-highway the market share of unmanned fueling stations has steadily grown from 13.1% in October 2005 to 26.5% in April 2011, with 5.9% the market share of unmanned stations in the highway market is still modest at the end of the sample period.
Our sample covers the time period between October 1, 2005 to April 25, 2011. Besides the price observations of the 240 highway sites, we also drop the price quotes of all 613 sites that entered and/or exited the market in this time period. We drop these sites because our difference-8 Data from the same source have been used in Soetevent et al. (2014) and Heijnen et al. (2015) . 9 Data collected by the Oil Price Information Service (OPIS) have been widely used in applied papers on pricing and price strategies, examples include Taylor and Hosken (2007) ; Doyle and Samphantharak (2008) , Chandra and Tappata (2011), Myers et al. (2011) , Lewis (2012 Lewis ( , 2014 and Tappata and Yan (2013) 11 See e.g. European Union (1999) , where it is argued in the Exxon/Mobil case that 'in some countries, it is possible to consider fuel retailing on motorways as a separate product market' (point 436). The Dutch antitrust agency has also mentioned differences in regulations and policies on approval for highway and off-highway stations (NMa, 2004) .
12 See Figure B2 in Heijnen et al. (2015) . the number of pumps etc.). These are used in calculating the propensity scores to find the appropriate control stations. Table 1 summarizes the main characteristics of our sample.
As for studies using OPIS data, one potential drawback is that prices are not reported for all stations for all days (Tappata and Yan, 2013, p. 6) . For stations in our sample on average a pricequote is registered every 2.8 days. This again compares well to the widely used OPIS data. 15
This may potentially bias our estimates if the data are not missing at random. Although the missing-at-random assumption is not refutable using the data alone 16 there is reason to suspect that missing data do not impact our results. First, one potential source of non-randomness is that drivers structurally avoid visiting the higher-priced stations which would bias our sample of observed prices towards the lower-end of the price distribution. Although this may be a concern in data composed of transaction data of private drivers, this arguably is less of an issue with fleet card data. Lessees do not pay for the fuel themselves which makes them rather unresponsive to prices. Second, the inclusion of day-specific fixed effects accounts for any bias caused by lessees having a different pattern of frequenting fuel stations than other drivers (they may for example drive relatively less in the weekend). Furthermore, only one lessee per day has to visit a station for a price quote of that station to be recorded. With over 125,000 cars, this sufficient condition is likely to be easily met for most stations.
13 One exception is Hosken, Silvia and Taylor (2011) who use six years of daily price data. 14 These data were obtained using Google Earth. 15 OPIS reports on its web site that prices of the majority of its stations are updated via a daily batch process similarly to ours with "transactions that are from 1-5 days old with the majority of prices being no older than 3 days." http://www.opisnet.com/about/methodology.aspx#RetailGas, visited 06/03/2015.
16 See Manski (2007, section 2.5) for a thoughtful treatment of this issue.
Price levels and changes in local market structure
In the period considered, fuel prices in the Netherlands have fluctuated widely. Figure Table A .1 provides summary statistics of these trends at the regional level and shows that the share of unmanned stations has importantly increased in all regions. Table 2 shows that per annum about 1.4 to 2.2 percent of all stations are automated. These conversions induce significant changes in the local market structure. Each year, 1.4-1.8% of all off-highway stations experience an increase in the number of unmanned off-highway competitors within a 1 km radius and these numbers increase to 3.9-6.5% and 12.6-21.1% for a 2 km and 17 The market share of an individual firm is defined as the percentage of all gasoline stations operating under one of the firm's brand names. Notes: Statistics include entries and exits. For historical reasons, the group of Shell, Esso, BP and Texaco is often referred to as the group of major firms. However, in terms of market share and brand premium, it is natural to consider Shell, Esso, BP, Texaco, Total and Q8 as the set of major stations. To avoid confusion, we will talk of the Major-4 and Major-6 firms, respectively. increase in the number of its unmanned competitors within a 5 km range. The totals for the entire period are lower than the sum of the percentages for individual years. This is because some sites see their number of unmanned competitors increase in more than one year. However, for the 2 km radius, this is only true for a total of 23 stations or 0.8% of the total number of stations.
The price effects of automation: Descriptive statistics
Our panel covers a period of more than five years. In each year a considerable number of stations are automated but which stations are automated when is not determined by random assignment.
In particular, firms may decide to convert specific stations in response to local market developments, some of which may be unobserved by the researcher. This endogeneity leads to two potential problems. First, the set of stations that is automated may not be representative for the full sample of stations. Second, because of selection effects, the set of stations automated in later years may show a different price response to automation when they operate in a different market context than sites automated earlier. Basker (2015) identifies larger price decreases for early adopters of scanners. She ascribes this to the higher potential of these early adopters to complement the scanners with other process improvements that increase efficiency. To allow for a heterogeneous price response in different periods, we split our price data into three separate sub-samples: the years 2006/2007, 2008/2009 and 2010 . Throughout descriptive statistics and estimates will be presented for each of these three sub-samples separately. The high number of automation-events per year combined with the high-frequency price data allows us to do this while retaining sufficient statistical power.
To address possible selection effects, Section 4 introduces a difference-in-difference matching (DDM) method that will, for each period considered, match the price quotes of stations that are automated in that period (the treatment group) with those of a comparable group of stations that do not experience automation in that period (the control group). Table 3 provides a first glance at the price effect at stations that are automated themselves or that are in the proximity of a station that is automated. To take out price fluctuations due to (international oil) price developments common to all firms, we calculate in Table 3 for each day the nationwide average price and subtract this from the individual price quote to obtain the price residuals. A negative number means that the price at that day was below the national average. Per station, we compute the average of these price residuals before and after the station (or a station in its close proximity) was automated. Table 3 does not lend much support to the presence of competitive spillovers: only for the years 2006/2007 we find that prices within a 1 km radius of an automated station experience a statistically significant drop of on average 0.3 cpl at the 5%-level.
The estimates in Table 3 however also suggest that the sample of automated stations is not representative because of selection effects. For all periods we observe that the average price in the neighborhood of stations being automated is already below the national average before the automation date. For distances up to 2 km, this deviation is almost always significant at the 1%-level. This suggests that stations are automated relatively more frequently in low-price where the population density is lower and the road network less connected seems over-represented in the set of automated sites. 18 Looking at the variable Major-6, one observes that whereas in the initial years especially the minor brands are very active in automating their stations, the major six firms increasingly start automating as of 2008.
It is clear that without further correction these difference between automated and nonautomated sites will bias our estimates of the effect of automation on prices. It is to this task of constructing a comparable set of automated and non-automated stations to which we turn next.
18 Figure A .2 in the online Appendix maps the zip code areas in the Netherlands. 
Empirical Strategy and Estimation Results
Propensity Score Matching
The previous section established that the set of stations that has experienced the 'event' of automation cannot be considered a random draw from the set of all stations. To obtain a set of automated and a set of non-automated stations that are comparable in terms of observable characteristics, we calculate for each station its propensity score: the predicted probability of being automated given the observed site characteristics (Rosenbaum and Rubin, 1983) . We distinguish the three time periods 2006/2007, 2008/2009 and 2010 . Thus for each station three different propensity scores -one for each time period -are calculated. 19 We use single nearest neighbor matching without replacement: For every treated station that is automated, the matched control station is determined to be the station with the propensity score closest to the score of the treated station. We set the maximum distance between the propensity score of a treated unit and its closest control match at 0.10. Treated units without a control within this distance are dropped to prevent that matched stations are in fact substantially different. 20
To avoid interference with other events, the pool of potential control stations is limited to those stations that, in the given time bracket ±180-days, were not automated themselves and that are not within a 5 km range of a station that is automated. This is not a severe limitation as this leaves us with a set of potential controls of 1,800 to 2,400 stations per period. Some of the treated stations possibly also experience an indirect effect in the time period considered because they are within a 5 km range of another station that is automated. In order to isolate the direct effect of becoming automated from the indirect effect, we drop these sites from the analysis. For this reason, the number of automated stations in Table 5 is smaller than in Table 4 . 21 Table 5 shows that the matching procedure leads to a selected sample of treatment (automated) and control (non-automated) stations that is similar in terms of observables. In fact, for none of the characteristics we find statistical significant differences at the 10%-level for any of the periods. 19 Table A .2 of the Online Appendix presents for each period the results of this probit regression. For each time period, an automation-dummy is regressed on the same set of explanatory variables as in Table 4 . For site variables such as 'Estimated volume sold' pre-2006 values are used to avoid ex post matching: matching on variables whose values may have changed due to the automation process studied.
20 Only two units were eliminated because of this threshold. 21 Of course, part of the estimated treatment effect picks up the indirect feedback effects caused by neighboring stations decreasing their prices in response to the lower prices of of their automated competitor. Competitors that respond by adopting automation themselves arguably have more leeway to reduce prices. In dropping sites within 5 km range that both experience automation in the same period, we ignore the latter effect. For this reason, our estimates of the treatment effect can be considered a conservative estimate of the total price effect (direct plus indirect effect) of automation. 
Selection of price observations
An important indicator of the similarity of the matched treatment and control stations -and thus for the success of matching -is whether price levels and price trends at matched treatment and control stations are similar in the pre-conversion period. However, such a comparison is not straightforward because stations convert at different calendar days. We address this as follows. For each treatment station i, we limit attention to the 180-day period around the date of conversion t i . As pre-treatment price observations of station i we take the set of price quotes p it with t ∈ {t : −90 ≤ t − t i < 0}. The post-treatment price observations is the set p it with t ∈ {t : 0 ≤ t − t i ≤ 90}. For the control station matched to station i, we similarly only include the price quotes observed within the 180-day window around the date of conversion t i . It may happen that for a given day t, a price quote is observed for the treatment station but not for the matched control station, or vice versa. To prevent this unbalance from biasing our results, we only include days for which price quotes of both the treatment and matched control station are observed.
In the left panels of Figure 2 , the individual dots present the matched individual price observations of treated (filled circles) and control (hollow diamonds) stations. The lines show the median value for treatment (solid) and control (dashed) group. Notice that within each period the pre-automation and post-automation price levels and trend are similar between the two groups. It is important that the prices in the two groups show parallel trends in the pre-automation period because the difference-in-differences estimator that we will apply only provides an unbiased estimate of the effect of automation if absent automation, the outcomes in the two groups would have followed parallel trends (Duflo et al., 2007) .
This empirical similarity in pre-treatment outcomes between the two groups is indicative of the "exogeneity" of the event of becoming automated to other station and regional characteristics that may correlate with price. However, in the final 28 and especially in the final 21 days before automation, this similarity seems less pronounced with the median price in the treatment group exhibiting a downward trend relative to the control group. This is driven by two anticipatory effects. First, some of the stations in the treatment group shut down a couple of days before being automated. The observation in Figure 2 that the cloud of price observations is noticeably less dense in the final 21 days before is proof of such an effect. This may generate some selection bias for this period. Second, the stations that continue to operate till the date of automation may anticipate the new price regime and already adjust their price level in the final days before 
Difference-in-Difference Matching Estimates
In this section we complement the visual evidence of the preceding section with statistical evidence by providing difference-in-difference matching (DDM) estimates. However, before presenting the results it is instructive to spell out the identifying assumptions. Let T be the set of stations in the treatment group. The set of control stations C consists of all stations j = N (i) that have been matched to a station i ∈ T by the nearest-neighbor matching procedure. We Define p 1it as potential price at station i at day t conditional on station i having been automated; similarly, p 0it is the potential price at station i at time t conditional on not having been automated. Under the assumption that the difference E[p 1it − p 0it |i, t] is a constant, say γ, the observed price p it can be written as:
with c i and c t site and calendar day fixed effects, X it time variant station characteristics on which we have information, such as brand name changes and changes in the number of local
Our DDM estimates use the difference in average pre-and post-treatment prices at treatment and control sites:p i,P re = 1 N i,P re t∈S
with N i,P re (N i,P ost ) the number of pre-treatment (post-treatment) price quotes of station i.
From (1), we get that
if i ∈ T and s = P ost and 0 otherwise.
We have that
The causal effect of interest is the population difference-in-differences
which is the joint price effect of all changes that happen at the station level at the date of automation: the effect of the automation itself, γ, plus the effect caused by changes in other station characteristics, β, for example a change in brand name that accompanies automation.
We will estimate the treatment effect using the sample analog of this difference in population means. As before, a price quote p it of a treatment (control) site i is only included if the price p jt of the matched control (treatment) site j is also observed at day t. This implies that N i,s = N j,s , s ∈ {P re, P ost}, for any pair matched pair of stations. Importantly, without this restrictionc s in equation (2) may be different for matched treatment and control sites if they are observed at different dates. That would potentially bias our estimates of the treatment effect.
As mentioned in the previous section, another bias arises if treatment stations already adjust prices in the pre-treatment period in anticipation of the upcoming conversion. If part of the effect already materializes in the pre-treatment period, this will lead to a downward bias of our estimates. We check for this by testing for Granger causality (Granger, 1969) in the following way. We regress prices on a sequence of weekly lags and leads plus time and station fixed effects c t and c i :
At the right-hand side of the equation, the coefficient δ 0 gives the effect on the day of conversion, the lags in the first sum the effects in the first 13 weeks post-treatment (δ −1 , . . . δ −13 ) and the leads in the second sum the anticipatory effects in the 12 weeks preceding treatment (δ 1 , . . . δ 12 ).
In the absence of anticipatory effects, the sum of lead effects,
12
τ =1 δ τ , should equal 0. As before, we will estimate (3) separately for the time periods 2006/2007, 2008/2009 and 2010 to check whether the effect of conversion is similar across years.
Estimation results
Direct effects
We next separately estimate the regression difference-in-difference equation (1) for each time period, including for each station k ∈ M i the price quotes p kt within the 180-day window around the conversion date t i . Table 6 presents the estimates in the row labeled "none". For all periods, we find strongly significant effects of automation on the price levels at automated sites with the estimated effect ranging from 1. Table 6 shows that the null hypothesis of the sum of lagged effects being equal to zero is firmly rejected (p < 0.01) for all periods. Table 6 also gives p-values for tests of the null hypothesis that the sum of leads equals zero. At the 5%-level, these tests cannot reject the null of no anticipatory effects. However, the p-values of 0.0870 and 0.0665 for the test 12 τ =1 δ τ = 0 in 2006/2007 and 2010, respectively, together with the significant estimate of the coefficients δ −3 · · · δ −1 for these periods in Figure 3a and 3c suggest some anticipatory effect. To assess how possible anticipatory effects influence our estimates, Table 6 also reports the estimated treatment effects for sub-samples of the data that take into account a transition period by excluding price quotes within 14, 28 or 42 days of the conversion date. 23 In all cases, the estimates are very similar to those without a transition period which leads us to conclude that anticipatory effects do not importantly bias the estimated treatment effects.
The effect of automation is comparable across the years considered. This result differs from Basker (2015) who finds that early adopters of scanning contribute disproportionately to the price decreases. There are some natural explanations for this difference. The first is simply that we consider a shorter time period than Basker: ceteris paribus, firms that adopt the same process innovation within five years from each other are likely to be less heterogeneous than when the time of adoption is up to twelve years apart. Another in our view more important reason can be found in the different nature of the innovation. Scanner quality increased over time and prices fell, such that over time also smaller sized stores increasingly installed scanners.
This makes selection effects more probable. Basker (2015, p. 358) argues that the earlier adopters had probably more to gain from scanning because they could combine them with the adoption of complementary technologies and processes, enabling larger price reductions. The scope for such efficiency enhancing complementary innovations however seems limited for the process innovation of automating service stations.
The estimated direct price effect is not only statistically significant but also economically important. A 1 to 2 percentage point drop is non-negligible compared to a gross retail margin that in the Netherlands is estimated to be about 12%. 24 Also, with 5.5 billion liters of Euro95 being annually sold in the Netherlands, potential savings in fuel by consumers amount to millions of euro per annum. Of course, extrapolating the price effect out of sample is problematic because in the longer run automation may cause for example changes in market concentration. 25
Unobserved Changes in Shop Operations
The regression estimates in the previous section account for brand name changes that coincide with the conversion of a self service station to an automated service station. It is however possible that next to changes in payment infrastructure and brand name, a conversion is also combined with a change in shop operations. In the most extreme case, the shop will be closed.
23 Similar to the 21 days around the conversion date not being considered in Figure 2b , d, and f. 24 Reported for August 2011 by BOVAG (2011, p. 25, Fig. 3.3) , the Dutch trade organization for employers in mobility. Hosken et al. (2008) also report an estimate of 12% for the average gross retail margin in the U.S.
25 Articles in the magazine for station owners support the view that the impact of automation on price levels that we identify in this paper for the period 2007-2010 has continued in the out-of-sample years that followed: "However, the overall growth of the unmanned segment increasingly forces staffed locations to give higher price discounts" (TankPro, 2016) . (1). Robust standard errrors in parentheses; errors are clustered at the matched treatment pair level. * * * ( * * , * ) : statistically significant from zero at the 1%-level (5%-level, 10%-level).
As mentioned previously, we unfortunately lack station-level information on such changes at the time of automation. As a result, the estimates in Table 6 may present the combined effect on prices of the payment innovation and unobserved shop changes not accounted for by the time variant brand dummies.
To assess the extent to which these unobserved changes bias our results, we divide our treatment group into two sub-samples based on whether or not a shop was present in the period before automation and perform the analysis for both groups separately. The idea is that stations without a shop pre-automation are very unlikely to experience a change in their shop operations at the time of automation. The estimates for this subgroup would thus isolate the effect of the change in payment infrastructure, whereas the estimates for the second subgroup would present the joint effect. Table 7 gives the results. A comparison of columns (1), (3) and (5) with the corresponding entries in Table 6 shows that the estimates for the years 2006/2007 and 2010 are very similar.
For the years 2008/2009 however, the estimates for the group of no-shop station are notably smaller in absolute sense than the corresponding estimates reported in Table 6 . Together with the observation that we previously found the biggest price impact for 2008/2009, this suggests that the estimates in column (2) of Table 6 at least partly reflect the effect of unobserved changes in shop operations.
That said, the estimates presented in Table 7 do not qualitatively change our main findings:
independent of the presence of a shop before conversion, automation has a very significant and consistent negative impact on prices. For all years, the price decrease is somewhat larger for the group of stations with a shop before automation. Although this difference of 0.3-0.9cpl is not statistically significant, it again suggests that part of the estimated effect in Table 6 is not caused by innovations in the payment process but should be ascribed to unobserved changes in shop operations.
Competitive Effects
Next we consider whether the lower prices at converted stations lead to price changes at local competitors. In estimating these indirect or spillover effects, we use a procedure similar to the one used to estimate the direct effect. First we identify for all periods the stations within a range of 1 km (2 km) of a station that was automated in this period. We consider the 1 and 2 km range for two reasons. First, the before/after price deviations in Table 3 do not suggest an indirect treatment effect at wider ranges. Second, for wider ranges, the majority of the stations will be in the treatment group (see Table 2 ) leaving the set from which we can draw the set of controls correspondingly small. We limit the pool of stations considered to off-highway stations that were not automated themselves in the given time period or half a year before or after. 26
We also exclude the 23 stations that experienced multiple automation within a 2 km range in the period 2006-2011.
Again, nearest neighbor propensity score estimation is used to match a station experiencing a conversion within a 1 km (2 km) range with a control station. 27 We subsequently use this selected sample to estimate a regression equivalent to equation (3) but with the dummy variable D it now reflecting "being within 1 km (2 km) range of a station that has been automated."
Plots of the estimated δ-coefficients are plotted in Figure 4 . Note that the scale of the vertical axis is one-tenth the scale of Figure 2 . The plots do not reveal a competitive effect. The point estimates for the 2 km range suggest a slightly downward jump after the event date but the precision is insufficient for this effect to be statistically significant. The non-significance of this difference is confirmed in Table 8 which shows that none of the null hypotheses on the joint insignificance of the lagged δ-coefficients is rejected at the 10%-level. The null hypothesis that the sum of the leads equals zero is not rejected at the 5%-level for any range and time period.
In sum, although some of the plots in Figure 4 suggest some competitive spillover effects to the prices of stations within a 1 to 2 km range of a site that is automated, these differences are statistically insignificant and never amount to a price decrease higher than 0.2 cpl. 
Conclusions
This paper has investigated the consequences of the sharp increase in automated fuel retailing that has been observed in several European countries. One market where these developments have played out is the Dutch retail gasoline market in the years from 2005 to 2011. This market is the focus of our empirical analysis.
Using a difference-in-differences matching method to estimate the effect of automation on prices, we find that automated stations reduce pre-tax prices with on average 1.0 to 2.1% instantly after the implementation of this process innovation and stabilize at this lower level in the months following. Following Basker (2015) , we empirically allow for the possibility that the early adopters of automation have a larger impact on price levels than the later adopters. Basker (2015) has identified such a heterogeneous effect for the adoption of scanning technology by US grocery stores, but our estimates for automated fuel retailing indicate that the price impact is similar-sized across years. The high-frequency nature of our price data at the station-level also enables the investigation of competitive spillovers to neighboring stations. The coefficients plots suggest a small but insignificant drop in prices at competing stations within 2 km after the date of automation.
In view of the billions liters of fuel annually sold and an estimated gross retail margin of about 12%, our estimates are not only a statistically significant but also economically important.
We hope our results will fuel the public debate in some European countries on whether or not automated stations should be prohibited through legislation. 
